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MUST GOD BE INCORPOREAL? 
David Paulsen 
Natural theologians have argued that God (logically) must be incorporeal, without body or 
parts. This conclusion apparently contradicts the common Christian beliefs that God (the 
Son) was incarnate in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, and now exists everlastingly with a 
resurrected body. In this paper, I examine the most common rational arguments for divine 
incorporeality and show that none of them is sufficient to prove it, and that, therefore, none 
need be a stumbling block to rational acceptance of the resurrected Christ as God. 
Thinkers within the western theistic tradition have for centuries reasoned that God 
(logically) must be incorporeal, without body or parts. Yet Christian theists com-
monly affirm that God (the Son) was incarnate in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, 
was crucified and raised from the dead, and now exists everlastingly with a resur-
rected (though gloriously transformed) body. These views apparently conflict. 
For if God must be incorporeal, then the resurrected Christ cannot be God. 
The problem can be expressed in terms of an inconsistent triad: 
(i) Jesus of Nazareth exists everlastingly with a resurrected 
body. 
(ii) Jesus of Nazareth is God. 
(iii) N (if x is God, then x is incorporeal). 
The conjunction of any two propositions of the triad entails the negation of the third. 
In this paper, I examine the most common rational arguments for proposition 
(iii); I conclude that none of them is sufficient to prove it, and, hence, that none 
ought be a stumbling block to rational acceptance of the resurrected Christ as God. 
The pattern of reasoning that these arguments typically follow, as well as two 
particular arguments, were set out by St. Anselm in the 11 th century. I St. Anselm 
defines God as "that than which none greater can be conceived." From this general 
definition, he deduces not only that God exists (by means of the famous onto-
logical argument), but what God is like. In particular, he argues that 'x is the 
greatest conceivable being' logically entails 'x is incorporeal.' It will be helpful to 
outline his position in some detail. 
In defining the formula 'greatest conceivable being,' Anselm makes it clear that 
by 'conceivable' he does not mean psychologically imaginable-otherwise, God's 
greatness would not exceed the limits of human thought. Thus, by 'greatest conceiv-
able being' he apparently means that than which no greater is logically possible. 
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As to what he means by 'greatest,' Anselm explains that the greatest conceiv-
able being would lack nothing that is 'good' and would be 'whatever it is better 
to be than not to be.' Contemporary commentators have plausibly suggested that 
in this context the value-terms ('greatest,' 'good,' 'better') are best understood 
as signifying religious values. On this view, when Anselm refers to 'the greatest 
conceivable being,' he means 'that than which a no more worthy of worship is 
logically possible.' The formula is often shortened to 'the most worthy object 
of religious worship' or 'the most adequate object of religious attitudes.' I will 
take these shortened formulae to be equivalent to that stated by Anselm. 2 
This bit of analysis provides the backdrop for six separate arguments for divine 
incorporeality, which I now examine. 
A. The Argument From Divine Infinity 
From the formula 'x is the greatest conceivable being,' Anselm first derives 
'x cannot be limited in any way.' J. N. Findlay suggests the following rationale: 
It is wholly anomalous to worship anything limited in any thinkable 
manner. For all limited superiorities are tainted with an obvious relativ-
ity, and can be dwarfed in thought by still mightier superiorities, in 
which process of being dwarfed they lose their claim upon our worshipful 
attitudes. And hence we are led on irresistibly to demand that our 
religious object ... should tower infinitely above all other objects. 3 
Then from the inference that God cannot be limited in any way, Anselm concludes 
that God cannot be or have a body. He argues: 
But everything that is in any way bounded by place ... is less than 
that which no law of place ... limits. Since then, nothing is greater 
than thou, no place ... contains thee; butthou are everywhere .... 4 
For altogether circumscribed is that which, when it is wholly in one 
place, cannot at the same time be in another. And this is seen to be 
true of corporeal things alone. But uncircumscribed is that which is, as 
whole, at the same time everywhere. And this is understood to be true 
of thee alone. 5 
Anselm's argument can be summarized as follows: 
A 
1. God = the most worthy object of religious worship. 
2. The most worthy object of religious worship cannot be limited 
in any way. 
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3. If God were corporeal, then he would be limited in that he 
could not be, as a whole, at the same time everywhere. 
4. Hence, God cannot be corporeal. (I) (2) (3) 
As a first, admittedly ad hominem, objection to premise 2, it is instructive to 
note that if it is understood literally, St. Anselm himself cannot consistently 
affirm it. For if God were absolutely unlimited, he would have to be the whole 
of reality, and thereby not the Creator-God of theistic theology who is ontolog-
ically distinct from his creations and who gives his creatures some measure of 
independence over against himself. It is the existence of the latter, I take it, that 
Anselm is attempting to prove. Similarly, if God were not limited in any way, 
God could not possess any determinate attributes, either positive or negative. 
For example, if God were immutable he would be limited in that he could not 
be mutable or if he were atemporal he would be limited in that he could not be 
temporal. Indeed, Findlay suggests that absolutely unlimited being may well 
entail "a deific absence of anything definite." But Anselm employs his deity-for-
mula to generate some eighteen divine attributes. 
Ad hominem objections aside, Findlay's assertion that it is absolutely anomalous 
to worship a being limited in any thinkable manner seems to mistakenly imply 
that a limitation, qua limitation, is thereby a defect. But surely this depends, 
rather, on the nature of the limitation. Obviously, a limitation in something that 
is not admirable-ignorance, selfishness, cruelty, etc., would be a good thing. 
Anselm makes it clear that the greatest possible being would be absolutely 
unlimited only in every admirable or great-making attribute. But even here we 
have long recognized that it is possible to "have too much of a good thing." A 
virtue taken to excess may become a tragic flaw. One may be too trusting, too 
generous, too helpful. Limitations, qua limitations, are value-neutral. Moreover, 
as Charles Hartshorne has taught us, not all values~specially in their superlative 
form-are logically compossible; for example, unlimited compassion and unli-
mited bliss. 6 Nor do all great-making properties or perfections admit of comple-
tion. Thus, divine perfection cannot coherently be understood as being complete 
in all respects. 
No doubt what Anselm meant, or should have meant, then, is 2': the most 
worthy object of religious worship must be unlimited in every respect in which 
to be so is (i) possible, (ii) admirable, and (iii) when conjoined with other 
excellences worship-worthy maximizing. [Hereafter, I shall let "wwm" denote 
conditions (ii) and (iii).] But if we replace premise 2 in St. Anselm's argument 
with 2', the argument is no longer valid. 
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B. The Argument from Divine Power 
In order to make St. Anselm's argument work now, we shall have to supply 
some additional premise(s). More specifically, we will need to show that there 
is some particular respect in which God must be absolutely unlimited that is 
both possible and wwm and, at the same time, incompatible with his being 
corporeal. Perhaps we may think that unlimited power would satisfy these con-
ditions; that is, perhaps we may think that the following proposition is true: 
5. It is both possible and wwm to be absolutely unlimited in power. 
Using 5 we can construct the following argument for divine incorporeality: 
B 
1. God = the most worthy object of religious worship. 
2'. The most worthy object of religious worship must be absolutely 
unlimited in every respect in which it is both possible and wwm 
to be so. 
5. It is both possible and wwm to be absolutely unlimited in power. 
6. N (if x is corporeal, then x is not absolutely unlimited in power.) 
7. Hence, God cannot be corporeal. 
We must now consider whether premise 5 is true. And the first question we must 
ask is, Is it possible for God to have absolutely unlimited power? Here the answer 
is clearly negative. Indeed, the logical paradoxes generated by the notion of 
absolutely unlimited power are too well-known to merit rehearsal. To salvage a 
coherent view of God, thinkers have been compelled to opt for definitions of omni-
potence considerably more restricted than its etymology would suggest. Recently, 
for example, Kenny has proposed that omnipotence be understood as "the pos-
session of all logically possible powers which is logically possible for a being with 
the attributes of God to possess," where "attributes" refers to properties of God 
that are not themselves powers. 7 
Given Kenny's proposal, how do we determine which attributes God possesses? 
If this is to be determined by revelation and if revelation confIrms that God (the Son) 
is embodied, then omnipotence must be understood in terms of the logically pos-
sible powers which is logically possible for, inter alia, an embodied God to have. 
So understood, there would be no conflict between divine power and divine 
embodiment. 
If on the other hand, we must ascertain all of the divine attributes by reasoning 
from St. Anselm's formula, we must ask: (i) how much power must the most 
worthy object of religious worship possess? and (ii) could an embodied being 
coherently possess that much power? 
In considering the first question, it seems evident that from a religious point 
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of view, the matter of God's power relates to our practical needs for individual 
help, protection, and preservation. We look to God for forgiveness of our sins 
and for power to repent, for strength to cope with and be refined by our adversities, 
for comfort in our trials, and above all, for salvation and eternal life. We trust 
that God's power is sufficient to satisfy these needs and expectations, and to 
fulfill all his purposes and promises. For this to be assured, it seems as if God 
must be supreme and have power over all things so that no one or no thing can 
thwart the fulfillment of his will. Let us use the term almighty to refer to the 
power described. 
If we grant-and it seems we must, at least from the perspective of the ordinary 
believer-that in order to be the most worthy object of religious worship it is 
necessary that God be almighty, must we also grant that such power is sufficient? 
It seems so. God's worship-worthiness connects most essentially with his personal 
and moral attributes-his holiness, his loving kindness, compassion, longsuffer-
ing, justice, equity, veracity-as they are faithfully and steadfastly expressed in 
his personal dealings and relations with us-as father, creator, savior, exemplar, 
and friend. His power too is relevant, but only to the extent that it is needful to 
accomplish those ends which he, as a perfectly loving and righteous father, 
freely chooses. To suppose otherwise is to affirm that there is something worship-
worthy about power per se quite apart from the good ends it makes possible. 
That some may, infact, value or even worship power for its own sake, I don't 
doubt. But this is neither religiously nor morally required. 
If my reasoning is correct, then it is neither possible nor wwm for God to be 
absolutely unlimited in power; and, thus, proposition 5 is false. But our analysis 
also supplies the following more satisfactory alternative to 5: 
5'. The most worthy object of religious worship must be almighty. 
To make St. Anselm's argument work, we must also show: 
8. N (If x is corporeal, then x is not almighty.) 
But is 8 true? If it is, it is by no means self-evident. Some further premise(s) 
must be supplied to show why a corporeal being cannot be almighty. St. Anselm' s 
argument suggests a possible connecting link-that is, his argument suggests 
that if God is almighty, he must be omnipresent; and that if he were omnipresent, 
he could not be corporeal. With these claims, we can again reconstruct Anselm's 
argument: 
C. The Argument From Divine Omnipresence 
The argument can be stated as follows: 
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c 
1. God = the most worthy object of religious worship. 
S'. The most worthy object of religious worship must be almighty. 
9. N (If x is almighty, then x is omnipresent). 
10. N (If x is omnipresent, then x is not corporeal). 
11. Hence, God cannot be corporeal. 
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To properly evaluate this argument, we must understand more clearly what is 
meant by the claim that God must be omnipresent. Anselm suggests that if God 
is omnipresent, then he is present, as a whole, at the same time everywhere. 
This notion is less puzzling when we consider it in its religious setting. Perhaps 
the idea is nowhere better captured than in the hymn of the Psalmist: 
Lord, thou hast examined me and knowest me. 
Thou knowest all, whether I sit down or rise up ... 
Where can I escape from thy spirit? Where can I flee from thy Presence? 
If I climb up to heaven, thou art there; 
If I make my bed in Sheol, again I find thee. 
If I take my flight to the frontiers of the morning or dwell at the limit of the 
western sea, 
Even there thy hand will meet me and thy right hand will hold me fast. R 
Religiousl y, the affirmation of God's omnipresence is the assurance of God's 
loving awareness of all that is transpiring, his constant watchful care,9 and his 
ability to intervene (in human history and in our individual lives) to fulfill his 
purposes and promises. Thus, it seems that divine omnipresence is crucially 
related to his power and knowledge; and that if he is almighty, then he must be 
omnipresent. 
This brings us to a consideration of premise 10. Is it true that an embodied 
being could not be omnipresent? The question has recently been carefully exam-
ined by Grace Dyck (now Jantzen). \0 She correctly points out that the claim that 
an embodied being cannot be omnipresent is ambiguous between 'His body 
cannot be everywhere,' which, she says, is true but harmless, and 'He cannot 
be everywhere,' which, she argues, is not necessarily true. The harmless truth 
follows analytically from the meaning of the word body. By definition, a body 
is spatially locatable and can only be in one place at one time. But if a being is 
omnipresent, then there is no place where it is not. Thus, is appears that the 
notions of omnipresence and corporeality are logically exclusive. II Dyck rebuts 
this conclusion by means of a careful analysis of the meaning of the relevant 
sense of 'presence' and, then, derivatively, of 'omnipresence.' Most critical to 
her analysis, she shows that (i) It is not the case that I am present only in the 
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volume of space occupied by my body; and (ii) To be present at x means, most 
essentially, to be aware of what is going on at x and, perhaps, to be able to some 
extent to influence it. In support of (i), we would surely say of a speaker addressing 
the Senate that he is present in the Senate Chambers even though it is not the case 
that the spatial coordinates of his body are co-extensive with those of the Chambers. 
And as to (ii), how would a Senator who slowly falls asleep as a bill is read and 
remains so throughout the ensuing debate, correctly answer the question, "Were 
you present when the measure was considered?" Or suppose a hearing on a bill to 
eliminate veteran's benefits is held in a hospital ward of comatose veterans. Could 
they correctly be said to be present for the hearing?12 
On her analysis, Dyck concludes that if God has a body which is spatially 
locatable somewhere in the universe and if, from that position, he knows and 
is able to influence everything that is going on, then he could properly be said 
to be omnipresent. If this is correct, then premise 10 is false, and the argument 
from omnipresence fails. 
But one may still feel constrained to ask, How would it be causally possible 
for God to be spatially located in the universe and yet be aware of and able to 
influence all that is going on? I don't know. This, I take it, is a question for the 
theologian. But, perhaps, two brief suggestions would not be out of order. First, 
Dyck points out that modem mathematicians have shown that three-dimensional 
geometry is not the only possible geometry, indicating that it is merely a limitation 
of our conceptual structure that we perceive only three spatial dimensions. Dyck 
thus conjectures that God may occupy or be localized in dimensions outside our 
ordinary experience from which he may express his 'thereness' in every part of 
the universe. 13 Second, a glorified body may be the source and locus from which 
emanates the divine spiritual influence everywhere immanent in the world. 
D. The Argument From Divine Indestructibility 
Anselm suggested a further argument for incorporeality when he wrote: 
For, whatever is composed of parts is not altogether one, but is in some 
part plural, and diverse from itself; and either in fact or in concept is 
capable of dissolution. But these things are alien to thee, thou than 
whom nothing better can be conceived of.14 
The following seems to capture his reasoning: 
D 
1. God = the most worthy object of religious worship. 
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12. The most worthy object of religious worship cannot be destruc-
tible in fact or in concept. 
13. N (If x is corporeal, then x is composite). 
14. N (If x is composite, then x is destructible, in fact or in concept). 
15. Hence, God cannot be corporeal. 
Considering premise 12, it seems evident that the most worthy object of 
religious worship cannot be destructible in fact. And let us grant, arguendo, that 
a corporeal being would, of necessity, in some sense be composite. What about 
premise l4? Is it true that whatever is composite is thereby destructible in fact? 
In Plato's Phaedo, it is noted that natural or physical bodies are composite and 
are often observed to be destroyed through a process of decomposition. From 
this it is concluded that all bodies, being composite, are likewise destructible. 
This, of course, does not deductively follow. And even if we grant that all natural 
bodies are liable to decomposition, it doesn't follow that a pneumikos body is. 
Finally, even if a pneumikos body were not inherently indestructible, it would 
not follow that God could not everlastingly sustain it in being. In sum, I find 
no conceptual incoherency in the notion of Christ's body being raised incorruptible 
or in the notion of an incorruptible body, per se. 
But what about St. Anselm's worry that a body, even if not destructible in 
fact, would nonetheless be destructible in concept? Are all bodies destructible 
in concept? I suppose this depends on our concept. If we think of a body as 
merely a composition of little bits of matter, then it seems as if we can imagine 
its being decomposed. On the other hand, if we think of a body (especially a 
pneumikos body) in terms of a field of force, the idea of its being decomposed 
is not so readily grasped. But even if we granted that the destruction of any 
body is consistently thinkable, what difference would it make? Our faith in God 
and his promises is ultimately personally grounded in the integrity of the divine 
character and will, and not in the mesh of conceptual necessity. Thus, it seems 
that divine indestructibility does not require incorporeality. 
E. The Argument From Divine Self-existence 
H. P. Owen in his recent book Concepts ofDeityI' provides two more arguments 
for divine incorporeality, in addition to the argument from divine infinity that 
we have already considered. He claims that corporeality is logically incompatible 
with both self-existence and moral perfection. His argument from divine self-
existence is very tersely stated: 
God's incorporeality can also be proved from his self-existence .... 
No material entity can be self-existent; for each is a determination, or 
mode, of being. Consequently we can always ask of any such entity: 
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"What are its causes and conditions?,,16 
The following seems to capture his reasoning: 
E 
1. God = the most worthy object of religious worship. 
16. The most worthy object of religious worship must be self-exis-
tent. 
17. N (If x is self-existent, then x is not a determination or mode 
of being). 
18. If God were or had a material body, he would be a determination 
or mode of being. 
19. Hence, God cannot have or be a material body. 
Premises 17 and 18 seem open to doubt or, at least, in need of clarification. 
Concerning 17, Owen has not explained what he means by a 'determination or 
mode of being,' but apparently he means something like a species or category 
of being, as contrasted with what? Totally undifferentiated being? If so, it seems 
that 17 proves too much. For personality. as well as corporeality, appears to be 
a mode or determination of being. By parity of reasoning, then, it would follow 
that a personal being could not be self-existent. But I see no basis for such a 
claim. Owen apparently provides the following argument for premise (17): 
(i) Of any determination or mode of being, one can always intellig-
ibly ask, What are its causes and conditions? 
(ii) Of a self-existent being, one can never intelligibly ask, What are 
its causes and conditions? 
(iii) Hence, a self-existent being cannot be a mode or determination 
of being. 
Premise (ii) appears to be analytically true and (iii) apparently follows from 
(i) and (ii). Premise (i) seems questionable. What can be intelligibly asked (i.e., 
without self-contradiction) is a function of the syntax and semantics of our 
language. For example, the reason why we cannot intelligibly ask about the 
causes and conditions of a self-existent being is that self-existent simply means 
"without cause or condition." Premise (i) does not appear to be analytically true. 
If I understand' determination or mode of being' correctly, it does not grammat-
ically imply 'must or could have a cause.' Whether some particular mode or 
determination of being is caused or uncaused is dependent on the nature of 
reality, not on the meaning or structure of our language. Thus, it seems, this 
support for premise 17 fails; and so the premise remains inconclusive. The 
argument from self-existence thus fails to prove that God must be incorporeal. 17 
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F. The Argument From Moral Perfection 
Owen's final argument for divine incorporeality is based on the claim that 
pure spirit is the most perfect form of being. He says: 
Moreover, if a dualistic view of mind and matter is correct we can see, 
not only that God's pure spirituality is possible, but also that it is the 
most perfect form of being. All human behavior approaches perfection 
to the extent that it expresses wisdom, goodness and love. Yet although 
the body aids these spiritual properties in so far as it offers a medium 
for their expression, it also inhibits them in many-and some tragically 
frustrating-ways. Hence only pure Spirit can constitute an absolutely 
perfect form of personal existence. IR 
His argument can be summarized as follows: 
F 
1. God = the most worthy object of religious worship. 
20. The most worthy object of religious worship must constitute 
an absolutely perfect form of personal existence. 
21. Only pure Spirit can constitute an absolutely perfect form of 
personal existence. 
22. N (If x is pure Spirit, then x is incorporeal). 
23. Thus, God cannot be corporeal. 
Owen acknowledges that the cogency of this argument depends on the Cartesian 
view that mind and matter are ontologically distinct, a view he does not attempt 
to justify. But Owen admits that unless it can be validated, we have no basis 
for affirming pure spirituality in God, since we could not give the concept any 
reference-range. It is significant to note that most contemporary defenses of the 
doctrine of divine incorporeality do not consist of positive arguments for it, but 
rather of attempts to salvage the notion of a totally unembodied person from 
charges that it is either cognitively meaningless or logically incoherent or contra-
indicated by the weight of psychological, physiological, and other evidence. I 
will not rehearse the arguments and evidence here. Suffice it so say that the 
Cartesian anthropology on which this argument rests does not appear to be 
rationally coercive. 
Assuming arguendo that there could be a totally unembodied mind, why should 
we consider this to be the most perfect form of personal existence? Owen suggests 
that human behavior approaches perfection to the extent that it expresses wisdom, 
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goodness, and love, and that the body inhibits these spiritual properties in 
"many-and some tragically frustrating-ways." Unfortunately, Owen does not 
explain just how the body acts as or constitutes such an inhibiting agency. 
Personally, I find the idea hard to grasp. Certainly, the body is not an independent 
agency that might override decisions or choices made by the mind. Might it then 
somehow be the source of all those desires or wants that may incline or tempt 
one to choose contrary to that which is wise, good, or loving? But to assign all 
these to the body and nothing but honorific attributes to the mind seems entirely 
gratuitous and without ground in reason or experience. (Ironically, in orthodox 
Christian theology, the most maliciously evil person-Satan-is also supposedly 
an unembodied mind or pure spirit.) It seems much more reasonable to predicate 
all attributes (praiseworthy and blameworthy) to the person, not to disparate 
parts of the same. 
But suppose we grant that a body is a causally necessary condition of our 
feeling certain desires or inclinations such as the desire for food or sexual 
gratification. Assuming that such desires and inclinations are not intrinsically 
evil, would they nonetheless necessarily inhibit a person from always choosing 
rightly? I don't see why. The New Testament describes the mortal Jesus as one 
who was tempted in all points such as we, but without sin. It might well be 
wondered whether one who has fully confronted temptation in all its guises and 
conquered it is not more worthy of admiration and worship than one who has 
never experienced a conflict. It seems then that premise 21 is false; and for all 
the reasons given, this argument too fails to demonstrate that God must be 
incorporeal. 
In sum, it appears that none of the common arguments for divine incorporeality 
considered herein is sufficient to prove it; and thus none ought be a stumbling 
block to rational acceptance of the resurrected Christ as God. 
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